EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Islam in Asia after Sept 11
(30 October 2001)
Islam. Asia. The two are rarely connected in
the American mind. For most of us, Islam is a faith of the Middle East,
intricately part of that human crucible's glories and tragedies.
But the vast majority of Muslims live in
Asia, which is home to the four largest Islamic countries in the world
(Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India). Islam in Asia is diverse, as
varied as Christianity in the West. Generalizations are therefore perilous.
Still, Asian Islam's lack of religious
militancy, increasing political importance, and relatively minor relevance to
Asian governments' reactions to U.S. anti-terrorism efforts have significant
meaning for U.S. policy.
So far, Asian Islam has been less militant
than its Middle Eastern variant. Asia's comparative economic successes, more
open civil societies, less repressive governments and rich, ingrained mixtures
of pre-Islamic traditions are likely explanations for the resistance to
militancy.
Whether Asian Islam will remain resistant to
radicalism is unpredictable. Muslim protests among several regional countries
during the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan suggest at least some empathy
with co-religionists. Indeed, the controversial Nobel laureate, V.S. Naipaul,
interviewed recently in The New York Times, rejects the very concept of
non-fundamentalist Islam, saying "it is a contradiction ... the idea of a
moderate state is something cooked up by politicians looking to get a few loans
here and there."
Naipaul has thus far been demonstrably wrong.
But we cannot be certain that the future will mimic the past and present.
Regardless of the degree of religious
militancy, Islam's resurgence in Asia is increasingly becoming fused with
expressions of discontent. Islamic politics rather than Islamic faith are the
principal aspect of the Islamic challenge in Asia.
And the root of Islamic politics is the sense
of grievance, of being disadvantaged. Though the specific discontents vary from
the Uyghurs in Western China (there are almost 20 million Muslims in China) to
the Achenese in Indonesia, Islam serves as a vehicle by which to articulate
frustration.
In much of Asia, Islamic activism is
connected to separatism. Indeed, it may be argued that originally ethnic
discontents have acquired the patina of Islam. Whether in Kashmir, Xianjiang or
the southern Philippines, Asian governments certainly conflate terrorism with
separatism, and both have an Islamic edge.
However, Islamic ends, such as the adoption
of Shari'a (Islamic law) or an Islamic state, are not the prime or only drives
of Asia's Islamic activists. The primacy of local grievance in Islamic
politics, however disconcerting, offers a reason for hope. If grievances are
political, there is the prospect of management and negotiation. Theological
imperatives brook no similar compromise.
Asian governments' response to U.S.
anti-terrorism policies are not motivated much by Islamic considerations.
Indeed, non-Islamic factors have dramatically triumphed over Muslim sentiment
in the case of Pakistan. Ironically, in India and Malaysia, anti-Islamic
stances have been utilized for political ends such as isolating the opposition
or mobilizing electoral support.
On the whole, cool calculations ranging from
monetary benefits, relations with the U.S., regime survival and balance of
power have led to general Asian government support for U.S. initiatives. Some
Asian governments' support is highly conditional on a quid pro quo: The U.S.
must bring its "national terrorism" under the rubric of the U.S.'s
"global terrorism."
India is an obvious case, but the Philippines
shares the same view. Conversely, a country like Pakistan wants to avoid U.S.
censure of its support of what it calls Muslim "freedom fighters" in
Kashmir.
These features of Asia's Islam suggest
several things relevant to U.S. policy in the region. First, Asian Islam is not
hopelessly militant, theologically chauvinist or anti-American. That's good
news. We can help keep Asian Islam moderate by appreciating that military
responses to terrorism will not be the sole avenue of success. Negotiation and
diplomacy must be part of our tool kit.
Even more important, the U.S. must work to
ensure that economic progress, political liberalization and open societies
flourish so that Islam does not become the lone avenue of expressing
grievances. We must also distinguish not only between Islam and terrorist acts
(as President Bush and his team have), but also between Islamic religious
extremism and Islamic politics in Asia.
Confusing the two threatens to skew our
responses, including getting caught in the thickets of Asian
"separatism" and "terrorism."
Finally, the U.S. should not dismiss
criticism of U.S. policies generally, and anti-terrorism specifically, as
inspired by Islamic radicals alone. Secular, modernizing nationalists in Asia
(Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad comes to mind) are occasionally
shrill about the U.S. too. Some of this is to be expected.
As the superpower, the United States will be
the subject of resentment, anger and blame. This comes with the turf. But to
dismiss all criticism as deriving from Islam, especially in Asia, would be to
miss the message.
We must tune in sensitively to Islam in Asia — understanding how it does, and does not, matter.